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SENTENCING AS CRAFTWORK
AND THE BINARY
EPISTEMOLOGIES OF THE
DISCRETIONARY DECISION
PROCESS
CYRUS TATA
Strathclyde University, UK
ABSTRACT
This article contends that it is time to take a critical look at a series of binary categories
which have dominated the scholarly and reform epistemologies of the sentencing
decision process. These binaries are: rules versus discretion; reason versus emotion;
offence versus offender; normative principles versus incoherence; aggravating versus
mitigating factors; and aggregate/tariff consistency versus individualized sentencing.
These binaries underpin both the ‘legal-rational’ tradition (by which I mean a view
of discretion as inherently suspect, a preference for the use of philosophy of punish-
ment justifications and an explanation of the decision process through factors or vari-
ables), and also the more recent rise of the ‘new penology’. Both approaches tend to
rely on ‘top-down’ assumptions of change, which pay limited attention to the agency
of penal workers. The article seeks to develop a conception of sentencing craftwork
as a social and interpretive process.1 In so doing, it applies and develops a number of
Kritzer’s observations (in this issue) about craftwork to sentencing. These craftwork
observations are: problem solving (applied to the rules–discretion and reason–emotion
dichotomies); skills and techniques (normative penal principles and the use of cogni-
tive analytical assumptions); consistency (tariff versus individualized sentencing);
clientele (applied to account giving and the reality of decision making versus
expression). By conceiving of sentencing as craftwork, the binary epistemologies of
the sentencing decision process, which have dominated (and limited) the scholarly
and policy sentencing imaginations, are revealed as dynamic, contingent, and syner-
gistic. However, this is not to say that such binaries are no more than empty rhetoric
concealing the reality of the decision process. Rather, these binaries serve as crucial
legitimating reference points in the vocabulary of sentencing account giving.
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INTRODUCTION
THE PURPOSE of this article is to reveal that scholarship about the senten-cing decision process (and indeed judicial decision making more gener-ally) is dominated by a series of taken-for-granted epistemic binaries.
The article exposes these binaries which are found in legal-rational scholar-
ship and in critiques of that scholarship (or consequences of it) in ‘the new
penology’ (Feeley and Simon, 1992, 1994). Legal-rational perspectives argue
that the sentencing decision process lacks: ‘coherence’ (e.g. Lovegrove, 1989;
Albrecht, 1994; Henham, 1998) structure, rationality, predictability, clarity and
certainty, and principled justification, and that it is in need of juridification.
Perspectives inspired by the new penology which are concerned with analysis
of ‘late modernity’ (Garland, 2001) and often (implicitly) critical of the legal-
rational tradition suggest that sentencing is becoming dominated by risk-
based conceptions of crime control. Furthermore, perspectives inspired by
the new penology suggest that punishment is increasingly concerned with
decision making driven by risk technologies (rather than substantive individ-
ualized judgment), categories and groups (rather than individuals) and the
calculation of risk (e.g. Feeley and Simon, 1992, 1994; Ericson and Haggerty,
1997; Franko Aas, 2005). These new penology perspectives detect an insidious
shift in power away from the ability of judges (who, it is said, are being
deskilled) to make substantive judgments and towards techno-rational
managers concerned with the distribution and allocation of risk.
The concerns of both the legal-rational tradition and the new penology
resonate with the ancient question (e.g. Nussbaum, 1986; Davis, 2002) of
whether judging is best empirically described as an art (as tends to be depicted
by the legal-rational tradition), or, becoming a (pseudo)science (as tends to
be depicted by the new penology). Seen from this art/science perspective,
these two traditions seem to be mutually contradictory opposites. Yet there
may be more commonality than first meets the eye. Both the legal-rational
tradition and the new penology share much of the same binary thinking
about sentencing, including: rules versus discretion; reason versus emotion;
rational deduction versus intuition; consistency versus individualization;
offence versus offender factors; aggravating versus mitigating factors; the
reality of decision making versus its rhetorical expression.
Moreover, both the legal-rational tradition and the new penology tend to
be inspired by evidence from official policy discourses. Legal-rational scholar-
ship tends to comprehend sentencing through an analysis of reported judg-
ments, and government discourse whereas new penology tends to concentrate
on official policy changes, media reporting and public discourse. While both
provide vital evidence of official and public discourses, neither approach
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concentrates much on the practices of actors on the ground. For example, in
any given jurisdiction, to what extent (if at all) and in what ways do the judg-
ments of the Court of Criminal Appeal really alter the daily work of first-
instance sentencers? Do changes in the climate (as seen in the discourse of
senior officials, politicians, etc.) affect the work of penal workers and if so,
how? How do apparently major shifts from one normative principle to
another (e.g. welfare to risk) play out on the ground? Both legal-rational and
new penology traditions tend implicitly to assume a relatively ‘top-down’
approach to policy change. How quickly or completely that change is expected
to occur cannot easily be specified, but nonetheless it is assumed that it must
have that effect.2 It is a question of ‘when’ not ‘whether’. In this sense, it is
a hierarchical and determinist view of the processes of transformation.
There is, of course, another school of thought on the process of the imple-
mentation of policy change which emphasizes that ‘street-level’ (Lipsky, 1980)
decision makers, in effect, make policy because they face various choices as
to how they implement it. This emphasizes not only that street-level actors
may or may not resist policy, but may do so consciously, subconsciously or
mix of these; may interpret it in different ways; comply or not; or, may create
ways of complying with the spirit rather than the letter of the law (e.g.
McBarnet and Whelan, 1997.
Thus by paying more serious attention to sentencing processes at street
level (as well as being aware of official and public discourses), it becomes
possible to explore the conception of sentencing as a craft. A conception of
sentencing as craftwork destabilizes long-assumed binaries in sentencing. In
so doing, these binaries can be recognized as dynamic rather than static,
fundamentally contingent rather than universal, and synergistic rather than
discrete and oppositional. By conceiving of sentencing as craftwork these
binaries are revealed as fluid, mutable, and, protean. Sentencing as craftwork
allows us to conceive of the judicial decision process as about both: choice
and order; implicit routine and explicit normative principle; analysis and
intuition; individualization and consistency; rationality and emotion; mind
and body. These qualities co-exist dynamically, are synergistic, and inhabit
each other.
These binaries are brought into focus by consideration of sentencing as a
craft. By drawing on the work of Howard Becker (1978), in his article in this
edition of this journal Herbert Kritzer outlines the dimensions of craftwork
and how these might be applied to judging. Here, I seek to consider, adapt and
develop a number of Kritzer’s observations on: problem solving, skills and
techniques, consistency, and clientele satisfaction. We will examine each of
these in turn.
PROBLEM SOLVING IN JUDGECRAFT
Much judicial work is boring to judges. Cowan and Hitchings (this issue) for
example, point out that despite the ‘dramatic consequences’ for possession
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proceedings against an occupier of social housing, courts treat the proceedings
as ‘usual, mundane, ordinary, commonplace, even dull’. So too the criminal
process and sentencing in particular. Research has observed that judges (like
other professionals) regard most of the cases which appear before them with
a weary insouciance (e.g. Carlen, 1976; McBarnet, 1981; Tata et al., 2006). The
criminal process normalizes and standardizes individual circumstances and
thus renders the unfamiliar familiar and repetitious. In other words, the
process of converting individuals and circumstances to cases means that they
are made boring by and to those who process them.
The fact that sentencing judges tend to regard most sentencing work as
largely repetitious and dull is significant for several reasons.3 Here, however,
I wish to concentrate on the relationship between rules and discretion in
judge craftwork. Kritzer (this issue) suggests that
while craftwork is often repetitious, it also regularly involves unanticipated
problem solving. Something does not work as expected or something goes
wrong, and the craftsperson has to make adjustments on the fly . . . The
craftsperson needs to be able to improvise in ways that both serve the ultimate
goal and which draw upon the craftperson’s skill and experience.
How might this be applied to sentencing? One might suggest, as Kritzer
appears to do, that a departure from the routine ‘when something does not
work as expected’ would be an unusual case where the judge has to make
adjustments from routine and exercise his/her discretion (individualized
justice). This view supposes that discretion is necessitated by the occasional
aberrant case which deviates from the rule and where the decision maker ‘has
to improvise’ in order to reach ‘the ultimate goal’ of justice. However, this
view of rules and discretion relies on what I refer to as a ‘juridical paradigm’
which counterposes rules and discretion as opposites; an assumption which
is undermined by a conception of judging as craftwork.
THE JURIDICAL PARADIGM: RULES VERSUS DISCRETION
The dichotomy between discretion and rules is apparent in both the traditions
of legal-rational scholarship and the ‘new penology’. Both traditions rely on
an understanding of discretion based on a ‘juridical paradigm’, which privi-
leges legal structure and principles (in the case of legal-rational tradition) or
risk-based rules (in the case of the new penology) over daily social practices.
The juridical paradigm understands the judgment process in sentencing
in one of two basic and competing ways: discretionary or ordered by rules.
According to this division, sentencing is either informal and thus essentially
lacking in structure, arbitrary and capricious, or it is governed by legal rules,
principles and policies. I seek to suggest that sentencing is ordered, and
predictable, but not by rules and policies alone. The legal-rational tradition
has been concerned with the need to tame, confine, and structure discretion
by recourse to rules. The new penology has also portrayed discretion and
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rules as in mutual opposition: more rules means less discretion and a move
from discretionary individualized justice to actuarial justice based on cate-
gories of risk.
This prevailing juridical view (on which both the legal-rational tradition
and the new penology rely) has been that if sentencing lacks legal rules, then
it must be discretionary and unpatterned. If it is not, then decisions are
presumed to be the product of individual judicial whims and fancy (as
portrayed by the legal-rational tradition) or individualized welfare justice (as
characterized by the new penology). The notion is that ‘more discretion
equals less order’. In this vision, law and official policy are seen as the obvious
and primary instruments to govern human behaviour. The juridical paradigm
regards legal rules as the main determinants of reason and order in decision
making. This conception is neatly captured by Dworkin’s (1977) celebrated
doughnut analogy: ‘Discretion, like the hole in a doughnut, does not exist
except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction’ (p. 31). In this
analogy discretion does not exist unless law permits it to. Discretion is
defined negatively: it is a void, a space. It is the reliance on this conception
of discretion and rules, which leads legal-rational scholars to identify a ‘gap’
between what legality supposes (‘the theory’/‘law in the books’) and the
empirical reality of practice (‘the practice’/‘law in action’). This ‘gap’ is only
a ‘problem’ if one expects that law is or should be the main governing source
of discretionary behaviour and is only unexpected if it is assumed that law
governs discretion. Indeed, there is only a ‘gap’ when viewed through the
juridical lens, which counterposes rules and discretion.
In this regard, the main difference between the new penology and legal
rationality is their normative evaluation of juridification. For legal-rationalists
juridification of sentencing is a good thing, whereas for writers inspired by
new penological concerns it is a bad thing: the erosion of discretion replaced
with risk techniques has been portrayed implicitly or explicitly as a negative
turn (O’Malley, 2004) and a move towards actuarial justice, calculability and
uniformity. Legal discretion is valued because it is thought to resist both
closure in decision making and the shift towards actuarial automation.
In this way, despite its intense concern with social history and penal trans-
formation, there has been only limited application of new penological ideas
to the daily routines of sentencing, and where this has been applied to
sentencing (e.g. Franko Aas, 2005) it has tended to rely on a juridical and
individualized view of the operation of discretion. Farnko Aas (2005: 15)
defines discretion as ‘the opposite of rules’. Rather than regarding legality as
the starting point to understanding discretionary legal behaviour, a focus on
judgecraft instead invites the possibility that rules and discretion are exer-
cised simultaneously and may only be mutually distinguishable in the
abstract. The indeterminacy of ‘rules’ and ‘facts’ as well as the shifting and
dynamic application of one to the other (Bourdieu, 1987) means that, from
a social-interpretive perspective, the scope of what is called ‘discretion’ and
‘rules’ is inescapably indeterminate in daily practice (even if an abstract
analysis might suggest greater precision). In this way what, in the abstract,
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we may term ‘rules’ and ‘discretion’ should not be counterposed as oppo-
sites. Rather ‘rules’ are inherently malleable, indeterminate and discretionary
while ‘discretion’ is inherently patterned, ordered, and rule-governed (e.g.
Baumgartner, 1992; Hawkins, 1992; Lacey, 1992). To put it in Dworkinian
terms: the dough is always full of discretion and the holes are replete with
codes, expectations and cultural-cum-organizational rules.4
An illustration of how the sharp distinction between rules and discretion
made in the abstract collapses when studying daily craftwork is that discre-
tionary decision makers tend to be able to decide the limits and scope of their
discretion. Thus in any particular instance, discretionary actors may define
their scope for discretion permissively and expansively or restrictively, even
to the point of denying any discretion at all. A dramatic example of self-
denial of discretion comes from Robert Cover’s (1975) historical study of the
Fugitive Slave Act: ‘Time and again the judiciary paraded its helplessness
before the law; lamented its harsh results yet nonetheless declined to use their
legal discretion to make “ameliorist” solutions possible’ (pp. 5–6). Other
examples include the way in which judges restricted their own discretion in
taking account of criminal convictions in their restrictive interpretation of
Section 29 of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act in England and Wales (e.g.
Brownlee, 1994); the way South African judges have denied themselves the
very discretion which they claimed to cherish in relation to mandatory
sentencing (van Zyl Smit, 2002); the way that prison officers focus on the
enforcement of their authority rather than ‘the rules’ (Leibling and Price,
2003); and the way in which sentencing judges choose to deny their own
discretion in passing short custodial sentences (Tata et al., 2006; Tombs and
Jagger, 2006). Thus, in selectively denying or expanding the scope of ‘rules’
and ‘discretion’, judges are exercising discretion. In this way, ‘rules’ and
‘discretion’ are better understood as fluid, unstable and synergistic rather
than as distinct entities locked in mutual opposition.
From this perspective it becomes implausible to talk of rules and discre-
tion as opposite forces or distinct from one another, or, to talk of a ‘balance’
between rules and discretion, or, to suggest that more rules means less discre-
tion or vice versa. In routine judgecraft, rules and discretion easily become
mutually indistinct. What we call ‘rules’ and ‘discretion’ contribute to a reser-
voir of account-giving resources to be used as a legitimating justification for
different courses of action. The juridical conception of rules versus discre-
tion is supported by a reason–emotion binary.
REASON–EMOTION BINARY The neat distinction between law and discre-
tion resonates with work on gender and law. Law is structuring, rational,
man-made, actively constructed, deliberately logical, abstract, universal,
principled, calculable and imposes itself. It is the subject. Discretion, on the
other hand, is the object. It is understood as a residue of rules: a ‘lack’, a
‘hole’, ‘void’, mysterious, capricious, fickle, emotional and needing to be
controlled and tamed by law. This is also reflective of fundamental enlighten-
ment models of reason versus emotion. From a legal-rational perspective take
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for example, Thomas’s seminal 1963 essay advocating reason giving as a way
of avoiding emotion:
If a judge is under an obligation to formulate and state the reasons for his
decision, it will be necessary for him to arrive at a decision for which proper
reasons can be given . . . The immediate effect of an obligatory statement of
reasons [would remove] the danger of sentences based on an immediate
emotional reaction to some feature of the offence. (Thomas, 1963: 246–7)
In a similar vein, but writing from a perspective inspired by new penological
concerns, Franko Aas (2005) argues that the move towards the use of rational
calculation in sentencing ignores the body (emotion, feeling and concern with
the humanity of decision making) in favour of the mind (rationality, program-
mability). Thus, in both the legal-rational tradition and in the new penology,
reason and emotion are counterposed and treated as mutually distinct entities.
Yet the concept of craftwork suggests that decisions may not be made purely
on the basis of ‘reason’ nor purely on the basis of ‘emotion’ but on a more
subtle synthesis of the two (gut feeling, intuition, hunch, etc.). Moreover, the
deployment of the display of emotions is critical to the public performance
of sentencing craft: a subject to which we now turn.
THE MANAGEMENT OF THE DISPLAY OF EMOTION Given that it is seen as
the opposite of reason, emotion is regarded by legal-rational scholarship as the
enemy of objectivity, neutrality and impersonality of judging. However, the
ability of judges not simply to suppress but to manage emotional displays is
crucial to the criminal and sentencing process. First, it is used instrumentally
to encourage desired outcomes, most particularly the closure of cases and
getting through the list (Mack and Roach Anleu, this issue). Recent ethno-
graphic research into the production and interpretation of pre-sentence reports
in Scotland5 (Tata et al., 2006, forthcoming; Halliday et al., 2007a) highlights
a central problem perceived by judges and other professionals engaged in the
sentencing process: the pervasive potential of so-called ‘innocent guilty pleas’
(a term coined by Bottoms and McClean, 1976). An ‘innocent guilty plea’ is
where the accused person who has formally pled guilty also denies (through
their accounts to pre-sentence report writers and others) that they were truly
guilty. For court professionals (especially judges, defence lawyers and pre-
sentence report writers) this presents a serious problem both in terms of time
and moral legitimacy, and it is crucial that convicted persons are managed and
persuaded that they or their defence lawyer should present an account which
avoids and suppresses any impression that it is incompatible with the formal
guilty plea. In this situation, sentencing judges use displays of emotion to try
both to influence the client directly and to influence the defence lawyer (Tata
et al., 2006). While in represented cases this process takes place via the defence
lawyer, in unrepresented cases ‘magistrates can be instrumental in encouraging
a defendant to feel remorse, guilt, shame, perhaps, relief or gratitude, and fear
of the consequences of re-offending rather than anger, contempt or indigna-
tion’ (Roach Anleu and Mack, 2005: 602–3).
TATA: SENTENCING AS CRAFTWORK 431
 © 2007 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
 at University of Strathclyde Library on August 22, 2007 http://sls.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
However, the management of the display of emotion is not simply used by
judges to hasten case processing. It can also be used to create delay and post-
ponement. As well as expediting the closure of cases, sentencing judges may
also seek to assuage their workload by encouraging ‘judge shopping’. They
may trade on (real or supposed) reputations and their (apparent) ability to
sentence on the basis of emotion. For example, where a judge might feel that
they have been given too many cases to get through, one possible strategy is
to let it be known through court clerks that she or he is in a ‘bad mood’.
Court ‘regulars’ may get the ‘joke’ while the influence on accused persons
can have the intended effect:
I think the sheriffs [i.e. judges] themselves kind of know [about their senten-
cing reputations]. I mean sheriffs know, they’ll make jokes about it, you know
. . . The other week, I know there was one of the sheriffs, it was late on, he had
a whole batch of reports to read and he’d just been given the court . . . that
morning because somebody else was off sick and, he phoned down to the clerk
and said, ‘I’ll be down in ten minutes, tell them I’m in a really foul mood and
everyone will get the jail this morning!’ in the hope that half of them will run
away! So, I mean, they sort of, they realise that that happens as well. (Defence
solicitor interview, pre-sentence reports research, Tata et al., 2006: 21)
In this way, the management of the display of emotions may play an import-
ant role in the legitimation and (thereby) expedition of criminal cases, and also
by achieving delay. Emotion is managed and selectively displayed in deliber-
ate, conscious ways which are calculated to achieve certain responses in
others. From that perspective, emotion is deployed rationally. Thus, a simple
demarcation between reason and emotion may not be sustainable (Mack and
Roach Anleu, this issue). As with rules and discretion, the reason–emotion
binary is mutable, contingent and synergistic.
We move now to look at another of the dimensions of craft advanced by
Kritzer: skills and techniques.
SKILLS AND TECHNIQUES IN SENTENCING JUDGECRAFT
Kritzer (this issue) observes that while some parts of the skill and technique
of craftworkers is ‘“knowledge” which can be systematized and conveyed
through written or verbal instruction . . . a significant amount of what the
accomplished craftsperson does cannot readily be described by the crafts-
person. She simply does it and does not think about it.’
Anyone who interviews judges about their decision making will have been
frustrated by a similar inability of judges to explain clearly how they came
to the judgment they did. Apprehending ‘the’ rationale for decision making
has long been a focus of frustration among sentencing scholars, particularly
in the legal-rational tradition, which is suspicious of intuition as a basis of
adjudication. A particular concern of both the legal-rational tradition and the
new penology is to explain the sentencing process by way of normative penal
rationales.
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THE NORMATIVE PENAL PRINCIPLES PARADIGM
The new penology has argued that the principle of risk is replacing substan-
tive individual judgments: ‘Actuarial risk has taken on hegemonic domi-
nance that supersedes other models of governance, such as welfare and other
disciplinary forms of regulation’ (Maurutto and Hannah-Moffat, 2006: 438).
Largely on the basis of analysis of official policy and public discourses,
sentencing is said to have previously been more concerned with the making
of substantive judgments on the basis of aims such as rehabilitation. This
welfarist tradition is said to be ebbing away and being replaced by the quite
distinct logic of risk calculation. However, recent close empirical research
into the operational practices of ‘risk’ and ‘welfare’ suggests a more complex
and fluid picture (e.g. Halliday et al., 2007a; Kemshall and Maguire, 2001;
Maurutto and Hannah-Moffat, 2006).
PRINCIPLES VERSUS INCOHERENCE In the legal-rational tradition ‘norma-
tive penal principles’ have been understood as a variation on the familiar
menu of: retribution and/or just deserts, incapacitation, general deterrence,
individual deterrence, rehabilitation, denunciation, and so on. The legal-
rational tradition has regarded sentencing scholarship and reform as lacking
in principled ‘coherence’. The opening mantra of most sentencing textbooks
supposes that sentencing practice is ultimately driven by these competing
rationales and that incoherence flows from dissensus in answer to the norma-
tive question, ‘why punish?’ Texts typically proceed to rehearse the standard
menu of normative philosophical aims of punishment (variously also referred
to as ‘principles’, ‘rationales’, ‘theories’, ‘goals’, ‘purposes’, etc.). Though
there is some variation on the theme, the message is normally unequivocal:
these principles or systems of thought are locked in a grand intellectual battle
and it is this battle which is at the root of ‘incoherence’ in sentencing practice.
Unless and until, it is said, we have consensus about which theory is best or
at least which hybrid of the theories, underlying incoherence in sentencing
will continue (e.g. Fox, 1994; Doob and Brodeur, 1995; Henham, 1996, 1997;
Hutton, 1997).
Let us first examine the thinking behind the idea that routine sentencing
work is best explained through the lens of normative principles. There has
been very little attempt to test whether or not judges base their decision
processes on penal principles. In other words, it has been largely taken for
granted that the use of discretion is fundamentally determined by one or more
of these specific principles. This proposition, which has become something
of a truism in sentencing scholarship, is widely regarded to have been scien-
tifically validated, most notably by the seminal work of John Hogarth.
In his pioneering and hugely influential study, Sentencing as a Human
Process, Hogarth (1971) advanced the thesis that sentencing is determined
largely by the penal philosophies of the individual sentencer. These norma-
tive principles are said to frame interpretively the information the individual
receives so that the sentence which the sentencer passes is consistent with
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his/her pre-existing penal philosophy and attitudes. The use of interpretive
schema is indeed crucial. However, Sentencing as a Human Process leaps
from finding that sentencers frame their judgments selectively to then
assuming that what is behind this process of interpretation must be explained
mainly in terms of individual philosophies.6
The second finding from Sentencing as a Human Process which merits re-
examination concerns the assumption that the production of sentencing
decisions is fundamentally an individual activity, albeit in the supplementary
context of some social factors: ‘While magistrates were inconsistent with each
other, they were consistent within themselves’ (Hogarth, 1971: 360).7 Yet
Sentencing as a Human Process might be characterized as ‘sentencing as an
individual cognitive process’. It presupposed that sentencing is driven by indi-
vidual philosophies and attitudes and ignored social and organizational influ-
ences. Likewise, two of the other most influential sentencing scholars of our
time, (David Thomas and Andrew von Hirsch), although occupying very
different policy camps, share a conception of sentencing as an individual intel-
lectual struggle. Indeed, even scholars advancing a sociology of sentencing (e.g.
Hutton, 2006) have been tempted to portray sentencing as an individual judi-
cial exercise. However, sentencing is not a discrete activity performed by an
individual judge working in isolation (Travers, 2006) but its agenda is moulded
earlier in the criminal process (e.g. Shapland, 1987; Hawkins, 2003), shaped
collaboratively with other professionals (e.g. Eisenstein and Jacob. 1991) and
inextricably bound with guilt-producing processes (e.g. Mather, 1979; Nardulli
et al., 1988; Tata et al., 2006). Thus, to talk about sentencing craftwork is not
to talk only of the craft of judges but of other sentencing professionals (e.g.
prosecutors, defence lawyers, pre-sentence report writers). From this perspec-
tive, we might query whether the term ‘judgecraft’ is the most appropriate way
to describe sentencing craftwork. There is a danger that it may lead us to
suppose that the craft of sentencing is performed by the judge alone.
Legal-rational scholarship has amply demonstrated that sentencers’ use of
normative penal principles is vague, bland, and contradictory. The normal
conclusion is that this ‘incoherence’ is reflective of a deeper normative penal
dissensus. However, conceiving of sentencing as craftwork leads us to
consider the social production of sentencing accounts as a purposive and prag-
matic entreprise, rather than as an individual intellectual exercise problem to
be solved (this point is discussed later in the section on ‘clientele’).
Together with analysing sentencing according to penal principles, there has
also been a fixation with the attempt to model decision making analytically
through the use of case ‘factors’, to which we now turn.
COGNITIVE-ANALYTICAL MODELLING OF THE DECISION PROCESS
By ‘cognitive-analytical modelling’, I am referring to the approach to decision
process research based on the assumption that the individual judge’s cogni-
tive processes determine decisions on the basis of personal-attitudinal and
434 SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 16(3)
 © 2007 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
 at University of Strathclyde Library on August 22, 2007 http://sls.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
case ‘factors’. Like the juridical paradigm, the cognitive-analytical model
looks to find sequential reasoning in judgment-making but is supplemented
by the power of universal ‘factors’. Both are attracted to logical and quasi-
mathematical metaphors (Davis, 2002).
Cognitive-analytical modelling of the sentencing decision process tends in
particular to portray cases (the ‘input’) as being composed of little more than
the sum of their basic elements: aggravating and mitigating factors.
THE BINARY OF AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS While the legal
literature is dominated by sentencing principles as the main analytic lens, the
empirical research literature is dominated by the tacit assumption that case
‘factors’ can be extracted and analysed to discern the relative explanatory
power of individual ‘pieces’ of information (e.g. Hogarth, 1971; Lovegrove,
1989; Spohn, 2002). Most research has consisted of
attempts, generally unsuccessful, to obtain greater predictive accuracy. The
typical approach to sentencing research is create a dependent variable (e.g.
sentence length) that is then regressed on select legal (e.g. offence type and seri-
ousness, history of offending) and extralegal (e.g. sex, race, socio-economic
status, plea bargaining) variables. (Mears, 1998: 670)
The idea of case factors which determine decision-making relies on two key
assumptions (which are similar to the assumptions underlying the other
binaries as static, discrete and universal). The first is that the sentencing
decision process can be most meaningfully understood by reducing it to the
supposedly essential and irreducible individual, component elements of each
case, and case type. Second, the concept of ‘factors’ assumes that each case
element (factor) enjoys its own discrete independent properties, and main-
tains its own power on the outcome of the case, universally.
Yet, what is a ‘factor’? How is a ‘factor’ identified? The cognitive-analytical
literature almost invariably assumes ‘factors’ as given or obvious. Typically,
studies explain that x per cent of sentencing decisions are ‘predicted’ by y
number of case factors. Most studies of sentencing are concerned with identi-
fying which factors are most associated statistically with sentencing outcome.
Rarely is any discussion devoted to how ‘factors’ are identified.
Cognitive-analytical work has tended simply to equate ‘factors’ with case
‘facts’. So not only does factorial explanation ignore how ‘facts’ are identified
or not, it also ignores their contingent, fluid, synergistic and constructed
nature. Yet criminological and socio-legal research into the criminal process
has now provided ample demonstration of the social construction of case
facts. The meaning of facts is contingent on the ever-evolving nature of the
case. However, the factorial approach must necessarily suppose that the
sentencing meaning of factors remains immutable and constant from one case
to the next and indeed during each case. Far from being discrete, immutable
and irreducible elements, in the routine decision process ‘factors’ are inextri-
cable and inseparable from the meaning of the constructed and reconstructed
typified whole-case narrative (Tata, 1997).
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Take the example of the employment position of an offender about to be
sentenced. The same information may both aggravate the seriousness of one
case and mitigate the seriousness of another. Being able to retain a job might
mitigate against a custodial sentence, or, being jobless might evoke greater
sympathy for an offender’s personal predicament. The same information may
be ‘aggravating’ and ‘mitigating’ in the same case (Shapland, 1987; Halliday
et al., 2007a). Intoxication is another simple illustration. It can suggest that
the offender did not really know what they were doing or acted out of char-
acter. On the other hand it might be understood to suggest a recklessness,
lack of respect for others or selfishness. Attempts to identify lists of aggra-
vating and mitigating factors as fixed and universal predictors are, therefore,
bound to fail.
THE OFFENCE–OFFENDER BINARY Sentencing research and sentencing re-
forms have almost universally understood cases as basically composed of
two parts: offence and the offender. Yet, while research repeatedly shows that
seriousness of criminal record is (along with offence information) one of the
two major influences on sentencing, just how criminal record plays a role in
the sentencing decision process has received surprisingly little attention
(Roberts, 1997). Again, and in common with offence information, the typical
and assumed approach is to identify ‘factors’ and to observe their numerical/
statistical association with sentence outcome, often on the presumption of a
‘two-staged process’ (the basis of all guideline grid systems), in which the
judge first considers the seriousness of the offence and then judges the seri-
ousness of criminal record.
Attempts to represent criminal history have not adequately captured
judicial understandings of similarity. This is because criminal record is under-
stood immediately and routinely by conferring meaning both on ‘offence’ and
‘offender’. ‘Offence’ and ‘offender’ information may be notionally and legally
distinct but interpretively they operate synergistically, constituting typified
whole-case stories (Tata, 1997). In a similar vein, Halliday et al. (2007b) found
that easily the most influential part of pre-sentence reports is that which
synergizes both offence and offender information in one single section to tell
a narrative, rather than biographical information which appears to sentencers
to be abstracted from offence information.
Although I wish to advocate a more interpretive approach to sentencing as
craftwork which escapes the individualized sentencing versus tariff sentencing
dichotomy, it is also true that sentencers may understand their identity in
part through the idea of balancing an individualized and tariff discourses of
justice. Intellectually and in the abstract, these two discourses of justice are
mutually contradictory. Yet sentencers appear routinely to rationalize their
decisions in these terms, by publicly performing a balancing act between
these two discourses, to which we now turn.
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CONSISTENCY
Unlike artwork, ‘the product of craftwork has the characteristic of consist-
ency’ (Kritzer, this issue). I will suggest, however, that sentencing craftwork
is also about individual craftworkers (most especially judges) inscribing their
personal signatures upon the crafted work (the case).
THE TARIFF VERSUS INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE BINARY
Both the new penology and legal-rational tradition have relied on a binary
in sentencing decision process which counterposes individualized sentencing
against tariff-based consistency. For example, mainly on the basis of evidence
of the operation of US numerical guidelines, Franko Aas (2005) presents a
shift in sentencing towards automation, homogenization and a spurious
consistency, and away from a concern with individualized justice. Indeed, the
new penology has been concerned to present a shift from welfare (associated
with individualized justice) to risk (associated with categories of people and
a supposed loss of discretion). However, research suggests that this risk–
welfare dichotomy is rather too simple and that ‘risk’ and ‘welfare’ are rather
more dynamic and synergistic than has been hitherto portrayed by the new
penology (e.g. Kemshall and Maguire, 2001; Robinson, 2002; Marutto and
Hannah-Moffat, 2006; Halliday et al., 2007a).
While the new penology tends to find tariff-based sentencing less humane
(and worse) than individualization, the reverse has tended to be true for
legal-rational tradition. In the legal-rational tradition, the dangers of individ-
ualized justice drive the search for the holy grail of ‘true’ consistency.
THE PERFORMANCE OF BALANCE BETWEEN INDIVIDUALIZED
AND TARIFF SENTENCING
While Kritzer (this issue) suggests that ‘the product of craftwork has the
characteristic of consistency’, it is also and simultaneously about individual-
ization and treating cases as unique (Flemming et al., 1992). Craft suggests both
a pursuit of consistency and leaving the craftworker’s personal mark to signify
the piece of work as having been treated as uniquely individual, and dealt with
by a unique individual craftworker (leaving, in effect, a personal signature).
One aspect of sentencing judgecraft is the performance of ‘balance’ between
two discourses of justice: tariff-based consistency and individualized justice.
Neither are representative of ‘the essence’ of sentencing and neither are
possible in a pure form (they are ‘ideal types’), but the performance of senten-
cing craft is about the performance of balance of these two idioms. For
example, in the use of the Scottish sentencing information system, judges
appear to find satisfying the ability to flick between an aggregate representa-
tion of justice (tables and graphs) and an individualized vision (text) (Hutton
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and Tata, 2000). This may be a way of underlining that sentencing craftwork
is at the same time both individualized and tariff-rule-based.
THE USES OF INCONSISTENCY AND SURREPTITIOUS CREATIVITY
While supposed disparity may sometimes be an artefact of conceiving of
sentencing through fixed and immutable binary epistemologies, there are also
instances where inconsistency (reputed or real) is deliberately traded upon
by judges to help to facilitate desired outcomes. One example of this is the
very strong awareness of ‘judge shopping’. For example,
Interviewer: And I noticed that you also said that he would be coming before
yourself.
Sheriff: Yes.
Interviewer: Rather than another sheriff.
Sheriff: Yes.
Interviewer: Is there a reason for doing that or is it . . .
Sheriff: The reason for doing that is that I suppose in a sense because there are
so many different sheriffs with so many different approaches to cases, and some
sheriffs are harder than others. And that’s inevitable because you’re dealing
with human beings. Perhaps I have a certain reputation for being quite hard or
quite strict, I don’t know. (Tata et al., 2006: 20)
Likewise, in order to juggle their workloads successfully, defence solicitors
sometimes deliberately rely on some of their clients failing to appear because
of the reputation of the judge they are told they will appear before that day
(Tata and Stephen, 2006). In this way, sentencing disparity (whether real or
imagined) is felt to be functionally useful and is institutionalized.
Judges may also deliberately seek to flout consistency (and the authority of
the Court of Criminal Appeal) by developing their own personal individual
sentencing policies. For example, ‘Well, for 13 years I’ve had my fist on the
bench and said – I’m just not having this! And I mean they now know. First
offender, doesn’t matter: you will go to prison for [offence]. Now that’s public
policy’ (Sheriff Court judge interview, Tata et al., 2006).
In other instances, the use of inconsistency (disparity) and deliberate avoid-
ance of rules may be more surreptitious. Here a sheriff explains that s/he sees
a custodial sentence as ‘the best detox available in [the area]’, and so was
concerned to apply sentencing powers creatively (and in contradiction to
Appeal Court guidance) in multiple conviction cases:
I’m happy to tell you on tape that I’m not meant to work out net sentencing –
I’m meant to sentence gross, as you probably know – but I did do a wee check
[laugh] just to see that he was going to do another 10 days in passing, cos I
wanted him to finish his detox. (Interview, Sheriff Court judge, Tata et al., 2006)
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While judge shopping and consequent failures of defendants to appear are
iniquitous and inefficient to the system as a whole, they are also seen as an
instrument tool of individual efficiency by court practitioners. Thus inter-
judge inconsistency is perpetuated by the craft of individual practitioners. In
this way inconsistency is institutionalized, even celebrated. For example, in
defending an element of disparity, lawyers and judges sometimes remark that
a certain amount of disparity presents unpredictability to defendants, thus
keeping them on their toes (Tata, 2007). Thus, inconsistency (and reputations
of inconsistency) cannot mainly or simply be explained by different individ-
ual judges having different penal attitudes and philosophies or ‘happenstance’
(von Hirsch, 1987: 4), nor by a lack of knowledge of where sentencers ‘sit in
relation to their brethren’ (Tata and Hutton, 2003: 67), nor by differences in
court cultures. Inconsistency is also functionally useful to the work of indi-
vidual court actors.8 Attempts to reduce disparity in sentencing will have to
address the way in which it lubricates the scope of action for court regulars.
Systemically the consequence of disparity is to undermine: legal equality,
transparency, and the ability of defendants to determine whether and when
to plead guilty. Not least because of these effects, inconsistency is regarded
by court professionals as an essential resource to make the system work.
A further significant way in which inconsistency is invoked by professionals
and regarded as useful is in the legitimation of the sentencing process. A belief
in the prevalence of disparity helps to persuade convicted persons to plead
guilty at time convenient to professionals (Tata, 2007), and to ‘close’ the case
(by refraining from saying anything to the court or pre-sentence report
writers which may be incompatible with the guilty plea). A belief in the
prevalence of disparity provides a central resource in persuading defendants
to believe they will receive (and have received) an unusually lenient sentence
or a generous discount in recognition of pleading guilty, and thus helps to
maintain relative client satisfaction (Tata, 2007). This will be taken up briefly
in the next section.
ACHIEVING CLIENTELE SATISFACTION (UTILITY AND INTERNAL
AESTHETIC)
Kritzer (this issue) suggests that (unlike artwork), in craftwork
there is an identifiable customer or clientele. The work is done on behalf of the
customer or clientele. Craftwork is typically done to two levels of specification.
One level is set by the customer or client; the other level is set by the norms of
the craft. The client may recognize the absence of some aspects of the internal
norms but will probably miss the most subtle aspects of it.
Krizter’s description suggests that in sentencing craftwork there might be two
levels of clientele audience: an external and an internal one. In sentencing, the
external clientele includes the convicted person, victim, media, and so on,
while the internal audience (other court professionals) is that concerned with
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inter- and intra-professional work norms (e.g. Flemming et al., 1992). The
internal audience members are the ones who enjoy the in-jokes, the ‘white
lies’ told to outsiders and recognize the displays of faux emotion referred to
earlier. This concept of clientele can be applied to a conception of account
giving as socially produced. Rather than seeing reasons as a true explanation
of the decision process, we might instead understand reason giving as a
central element of judgecraft: reasons are necessarily purposive (Tata, 2002).
Reasons do not need to be ‘true’ but justifiable and capable of satisfying
multiple clientele audiences, each of whom have different, and sometimes
contradictory, concerns.
THE ‘APPARENT’ VERSUS ‘REAL’ REASONS BINARY
In the study of discretionary decision processes (not least in sentencing), there
has been a long quest to uncover the ‘real’ reason behind decision making.
Much of the literature exposes the contradictory, bland and incoherent char-
acter of publicly given reasons by decision makers. It is widely believed that
such reasons fail to reveal the true character of the decision process. Indeed,
the empirical discretion literature has tended to talk of reasons as ‘post-hoc
justification’ or ‘rationalization’, implying a distinction between rhetoric and
reality. However, from the perspective of achieving clientele satisfaction in
craftwork, this distinction between rhetoric and reality can be revised.
A key part of reason-giving craftwork is to satisfy a multiplicity of conflict-
ing expectations and audiences. This may help to explain further why senten-
cing reasons seem contradictory and ‘incoherent’. Rational explanation is one
requirement of reason giving but so are legitimation and clientele satisfaction.
I do not mean to suggest here that written judgments are duplicitous but
simply that sentencing reason giving is necessarily purposive.9 Reasons are not
provided as a simple report of the consciousness of thought. Rather, reasons
are ever-purposive accounts conscious of audience, interpretation, culture and
power (Tata, 2002). Writing about the media as an integral part of criminal
justice, Ericson (1995) explains that the formal obligation to give an account
‘varies, for example, by what has to be accounted for; who makes the demand
. . . who is the intended audience . . . and the spatial, social, cultural and
communications format capacities to make an account’ (p. 137). There is no
unmediated account of judging waiting to be found. We cannot observe the
thinking of others (e.g. sentencers) in the absence of language and expression
(Wittgenstein, 1958/2001; Shulte, 1992). Although much empirical research
(including my own) has searched to try to achieve it, we cannot look inside
their heads to find the ‘true’ rationale of their decision as opposed to a mere
presentation of it. Thought cannot be observed separately from expression.
Thus, the attempt to search for the authentic reality of decision making as
opposed to ‘mere’ accounts of it is futile.
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THE CRAFT OF ACHIEVING CLIENTELE SATISFACTION
Moreover, part of judgecraft is in achieving satisfaction among clientele:
‘There is a large and growing literature that considers procedural justice as
influencing litigants’ assessments of their treatment in court or similar
settings . . . and arguably much of the assessment will deal with how parties
feel they have been treated by the judge’ (Kritzer, this issue). How, then,
does the sentencing process achieve the relative satisfaction of convicted
persons?10 One way is by invoking reputations of inconsistency (see above).
Not only are the clients’ expectations shaped by the defence solicitor but
other professionals can help to seal the message: ‘you’re lucky to have got
off so lightly’. Where judges and pre-sentence report writers affirm the
defence lawyer’s advice to the client, it is regarded as a particularly powerful
unified message to manage the client. For example,
On many occasions when [the judge is] giving them liberty as an alternative to
incarceration [she or he] asks, ‘Are you aware of that?’ And if your client can
see at that stage something which is indicative of the pains of the court being
visited upon him, albeit he’s getting his liberty, then you’re hitting your target.
So the client is very aware: ‘I’m in real trouble here and I totally appreciate if
I slip up once, I’ve even spoken to my lawyer, I’m going to jail for three years.’
And the sheriff says, ‘You’re absolutely dead right!’ (Interview with defence
solicitor, Tata et al., 2006: 18)
In their ability to mollify conflicting audiences, to be read at a number of
different levels and to hold at bay a variety of potentially critical voices, might
there be believed to be by internal clientele audiences ‘an internal aesthetic’
(Kritzer, this issue) (or what Becker (1978: 865) describes as ‘virtuoso skill’)
in sentencing judgecraft?
CONCLUSION
This article has aimed to reveal that although they disagree strongly with each
other about many normative points, the two most used frameworks for
understanding sentencing practice share a series of key binary assumptions.
Both the legal-rational tradition and the new penology are inspired by
evidence of change at the level of official and media discourse. While that
discourse is very important, heavy reliance on it leads to a top-down view
of change and tends to neglect the agency of penal workers. Conceiving of
sentencing as craftwork helps us to try to understand from within the pers-
pective of sentencing craftworkers the apparent contradictions of sentencing
work which may seem perverse from the outside: ‘a way of seeking to appreci-
ate the pressures of just doing the job . . . trying to explain social processes
that are outrageous from the researcher’s perspective’ (Cowan and Hitchings,
this issue).
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Thinking of sentencing as craftwork also facilitates an understanding of the
sentencing process which is not overwhelmingly focused on the judge as
the decision maker, but rather as part of a sequence in a decision process,
where the judge is a member (albeit the most central) of a collaborative
sentencing world. Consequently, craftwork focuses our attention on senten-
cing as a social process, rather than simply as an individual judicial exercise
chiefly based on the application of principles to case facts. Furthermore, craft-
work disturbs the taken-for-granted assumption that sentencing (and other
discretionary decision making) are best explained by resort to a cognitive-
analytical factorial approach. This is not to suggest that quantitative methods
should be avoided, but to ask what other approaches we might adopt to
characterize and quantify cases (e.g. ‘typified whole-case stories’). Craftwork
also suggests that disparity in sentencing practices is not simply produced by
accident, ignorance, or culture but is actively perpetuated and celebrated
by professionals engaged in the sentencing process. Craftwork also focuses
our attention on the dynamics of reason giving as inescapably purposive. This
may ultimately lead us to relinquish the quest for concealed ‘true’ or ‘real’
reasons for decision making and to study sentencing talk and expression in
all their varied forms and contexts.
Both the legal-rational tradition and new penology operate their character-
izations of sentencing practice on the basis of binary oppositional distinctions:
rules versus discretion; reason versus emotion; normative penal principles
versus non-rationality; aggravation versus mitigation; offence versus offender;
individualized punishment versus the tariff; apparent reasons versus real
reasons. By conceiving of sentencing practice as craftwork, these binary
distinctions are shown to be fundamentally contingent, protean, mutually
inhabiting, and dynamic. In the daily routine of sentencing craft these
binaries may dissolve and become mutually indistinguishable and yet appear
again elsewhere.
This is not to say, however, that these binaries are no more than empty
rhetoric concealing the ‘true’ nature of sentencing. Rather these categories
are useful to sentencing professionals (by which I mean not only judges but
others involved in the sentencing enterprise). These binaries constitute a
currency of legitimating reference points. The binaries comprise some of the
vital touchstones of legitimation and can be deployed to imply (especially to
external audiences) determinacy in decision making, while also offering
potential versatility, agility and indeterminacy to professionals. They provide
sentencing professionals with a currency of persuasive techniques which can
manage external (the defendant, the victim, and other publics) and internal
(other court professionals) audiences.
Sentencing professionals can believe in and employ these binary categories
one moment and dismiss them the next because they depend on local,
temporal, and case contexts and the professionals largely control the definition
of ‘context’. Thus, in the craft of sentencing talk these binaries can appear at
one moment and disappear at the next. These binaries are, in practice, impos-
sible to apprehend and define regardless of context. They operate dynamically,
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contingently, and synergistically and have little empirical essence to which
they can be reduced. Sentencing scholarship has largely been preoccupied
with the attempt to apprehend the empirical essence of these binary categories,
to comprehend and measure them as fixed, universal, non-contingent, discrete
entities regardless of time or context. A sociology of sentencing craftwork
invites us to ask whether that endeavour to apprehend, capture, and fix the
essence of these binaries as empirical categories may be unrealizable.
NOTES
I wish to express my gratitude to the following people for their observations and
suggestions on an earlier version of this article: the editors of this special issue on
judgecraft (Richard Moorhead and Dave Cowan), the anonymous reviewers, Kathy
Mack, Neil Hutton, Sharyn Roach Anleu, Max Travers, Herbert Kritzer, Simon
Halliday, Katie Millar, Julia Davis and Fergus McNeill.
1. Although there is now a rich literature in the sociology of punishment (especi-
ally penal change at the level of policy and rhetoric), there has been very little
work which seeks to develop a sociology of the day-to-day allocation of
punishment (sentencing).
2. For example, in seeking to demonstrate awareness that concentration on official
discourse does not necessarily change practice as intended, Garland (2001) also
reveals a (slightly restrained) top-down view of change:
A new configuration does not fully and finally emerge until it is formed in the
minds and habits of those who work in the system. Until these personnel have a
settled habitus appropriate to the field, enabling them to cope with its demands
and reproduce it ‘as a matter of course’, the process of change remains partial and
incomplete. (p. 24, emphasis added except ‘habitus’)
While the point that top-down change cannot be assumed to be ‘fully or finally’
complete, it is nevertheless assumed to be inevitable that official policy
discourse will filter down to ground level in more or less the intended way.
3. One is that it enables distancing so as to render the convicted person more
punishable (e.g. Tombs, 2006). It also facilitates a belief in the triviality of the
case (including that the convicted person does not care or expects to be
punished). These also work together with the need to get through the list (e.g.
Flemming et al., 1992; Mack and Roach Anleu, this issue).
4. This binary of ‘rules’ and ‘discretion’ is reflective of the dichotomy between
‘structure’ and ‘action’ in social theory, which some thinkers argue is an arti-
ficial dichotomy (Sewell, 1992). Bourdieu (1977) illustrates the synergistic
relationship between the material (the world of objects) and ‘mental structures’.
5. That research (ESRC award number RB000239939) has aimed to understand
the process of communication between report writers and sentencers in the
Sheriff Courts of Scotland. Although it is not intended in this article to provide
an overview of that research, a few of the findings are mentioned here to illus-
trate some of the points made in the wider argument. The aims of the four-year
research study were achieved through ethnographic observation of the process
of the production of reports (observations of client interviews, the report-
writing environment, shadow report writing and post-report writing inter-
views). And also, by seeking to understand how Sheriffs (professional judges
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in Scotland’s intermediate criminal courts) read and interpret those reports
(including especially those same reports whose production had already been
observed) through: pre- and post-sentencing hearing interviews with sheriffs,
observation of sentencing hearings, focus groups, moot sentencing hearings of
cases observed in the report writing research, pre- and post-interviews, inter-
views with prosecutors and defence agents.
6. Magistrates were presented with questions about the ‘classical purposes of
sentencing’. The only attitudinal framework which the study offered subjects
was in terms of philosophical principles. From there Hogarth (1971) quickly
proceeded to enquire about the correlations between philosophies, their relative
weights, and how they are used as cognitive frames through which meaning is
constructed by each individual magistrate.
7. Characterizing individual magistrates as deterrent or reformation orientated,
Hogarth (1971) concluded that
In summary, the fundamental problems in sentencing arise from the fact that there
is lack of agreement as to the social purposes that sentencing should serve . . . In
this situation it is not surprising that there is some uncertainty, confusion, and
lack of agreement among judges in their approach to sentencing problems which,
in turn, leads to disparity in sentencing practice. (p. 6)
8. In saying this I do not wish to be taken to suggest that inconsistency is desirable.
9. Conceiving of the creation of judgments as craft rather than an art encourages
us to think about purposes: ‘Craft implies practical utility, art does not’ (Becker,
1978: 887).
10. Of course, formally it is not for the judge to ‘satisfy’ the defendant/convicted
person. However, it is in the interests of all court actors that cases are closed
without ‘unnecessary’ difficulty: early guilty pleas in particular are a way to this,
and (as discussed earlier) it is important that the case ‘closes’ without the accused
being ‘in denial’ (an ‘innocent guilty plea’).
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